Material Weaknesses Identified
Executive Risk Assessment - Board Decision Required

What This Means: 47 P1 (critical priority) tickets breached the 4-hour resolution Service Level Agreement. Average breach time: 6.2 hours (156% over SLA). This indicates systematic gaps in incident response capability, particularly during evening/weekend hours (8PM-8AM).

Business Impact:

• 🔴 Customer service disruption: Property management system down for residents in 3 developments (DAMAC Hills, DAMAC Marina, Crystals)
• 💰 Financial impact: ~$185K in estimated revenue loss from delayed unit sales/service disruptions
• ⚖️ Compliance risk: Violates ITIL SLA.01 control (DAMAC's own SLA commitments)
• 👥 Staff burnout: L2 support team working extended hours without overtime compensation

Root Cause: Only 2 L2 incident managers covering 24/7 schedule (should be 3-4). Evening shift (6PM-6AM) has only 1 person. No escalation procedure when queue exceeds 3 incidents.

How To Fix (30-day action plan):

1. Week 1: Implement incident triage workflow - P1 tickets routed to senior engineer first, no queue buildup
2. Week 1-2: Hire/contract 1 additional L2 support person for evening shift (6PM-2AM coverage)
3. Week 2: Establish escalation triggers: if P1 queue > 2 incidents, auto-escalate to manager
4. Week 3: Create P1 response playbook for Yardi (most breaches). Target: 15-min first response
5. Week 4: Review and verify no new SLA breaches. Track 24/7 for 2 weeks before closure

Owner & Timeline: VP Infrastructure (Decision maker) + L2 Manager (Executor). Decision needed this week. New hire by Jan 20. Full resolution by Feb 28.

What This Means: The same authentication error (Token Refresh Failure: Code ERR_TOKEN_EXPIRED) has occurred 156 times over 90 days. Each time it's fixed temporarily (token restarted), but the root cause is never addressed. This is a CRITICAL problem management failure - Problem MGMT controls are broken.

Business Impact:

• 🔴 Service instability: Property managers lose system access for 15-30 minutes, 156 times. Zero confidence in system reliability
• 💰 Financial impact: ~$320K in estimated lost productivity (156 incidents × 30 min × 15 property managers × $30/hour)
• ⚖️ Systemic risk: Problem Management control ITIL.PRB.02 is FAILED - indicates broken change/incident processes
• 👥 Operational burden: Same issue troubleshooted 156 times instead of solving it once

Root Cause Analysis: Yardi API token expires every 24 hours but refresh mechanism doesn't auto-renew properly. Restart clears error for 24h, but underlying code bug in token lifecycle isn't fixed. Problem originally reported Aug 2024 but never escalated for permanent fix.

How To Fix (45-day action plan):

1. Day 1-3: Create Problem ticket PRB-2024-YARDI-TOKEN with priority HIGH. Assign to Yardi system owner + DBA
2. Day 3-7: Root cause analysis: Debug Yardi API token lifecycle, identify why auto-refresh is failing
3. Day 7-14: Implement permanent fix: Deploy code patch for token refresh mechanism + test in UAT
4. Day 14-21: Deploy to production with 24-hour monitoring for any token errors
5. Day 21-45: Monitor 3 weeks. If no errors, close problem. If errors occur, escalate to vendor (Yardi support)
6. Action: Implement preventive measure: Auto-escalation if same error occurs 3x in one day (currently it's not escalated until manual notice)

Owner & Timeline: Yardi System Owner (Decision) + Database Team (Executor). Root cause analysis required by Jan 12. Fix deployed by Jan 25. Closed by Feb 15.

What This Means: 23 changes marked as "Emergency" were deployed directly to production without going through the Change Advisory Board (CAB) review process. This bypasses approval controls. 8 of these affected financial systems (Oracle FICO, GL), 12 affected infrastructure (networking, databases). Only 5 had documented approval (email from manager - not formal). This is a CRITICAL control failure.

Business Impact:

• ⚠️ Risk exposure: 23 unauthorized changes with unknown impact. Could have introduced security vulnerabilities, data corruption, or operational issues
• 💰 Financial risk: If any change caused financial data corruption/loss, liability could exceed $500K+. No rollback documentation for 18 of 23 changes
• 🔐 Security risk: Changes bypass change management controls (ISO 27001 A.12.1.2). Could hide unauthorized modifications or backdoors
• ⚖️ Audit/Compliance: MATERIAL WEAKNESS in Change Management control. Must be reported to external auditors and management. Affects SOX compliance
• 👥 Accountability gap: No traceability. Don't know exactly what changed, who approved it, or rollback procedures

Root Cause: CAB process requires 5 days lead time. Teams use "Emergency" label to bypass this. VP Operations allows verbal approval. No automated control preventing emergency changes. No audit trail enforcement.

How To Fix (60-day action plan):

1. Week 1: Audit all 23 emergency changes: Document what changed, risk assessment, rollback plan. Get retroactive approvals where possible
2. Week 1-2: Define Emergency threshold: ONLY production outages (down >30 min) + security incidents qualify. All other changes go to CAB
3. Week 2: Create Fast-track CAB process: 24-hour approval for urgent changes (not emergency). Teams no longer have bypass option
4. Week 2-3: Implement technical controls: Change management system blocks emergency classification without VP sign-off + written justification
5. Week 3: Establish monitoring: Weekly CAB metrics. Alert if >2 emergency changes in same week
6. Week 4: Train all teams on new process. Remove "Emergency" as a general bypass option

Owner & Timeline: Chief Infrastructure Officer (Decision maker) + Change Manager (Executor). Must remediate within 30 days (audit expectation). Full control effectiveness by Day 60. Requires board-level sign-off on remediation timeline.

What This Means: 24 admin/privileged access requests to financial systems were approved in the last 90 days without proper authorization documentation. Most had only IT manager approval (no business owner sign-off). Only 6 of 24 had documented business justification. No evidence of segregation of duty reviews. This violates SOX IT General Controls requirements.

Business Impact:

• 🔐 Security risk: Privileged accounts could enable fraud, data theft, or unauthorized changes to financial records
• 💰 Financial/Audit risk: SOX non-compliance can result in material weaknesses & restatement. Auditor will require evidence of compensating controls
• ⚖️ Regulatory exposure: If a breach occurs from privileged account access, DAMAC could be liable for regulatory fines + shareholder liability
• 👥 Insider threat exposure: 24 staff now have financial system admin access with no documented business reason
• 📋 Audit findings: Material Weakness in Access Control (IT.AC.01). Will appear on SOX audit report

Root Cause: Access request form doesn't require business owner approval, only IT manager. No supervisor verification in workflow. IT automates approval based on template. No periodic access reviews to remove unnecessary privileges.

How To Fix (45-day action plan):

1. Week 1: Immediate action: Review 24 access grants, identify which are unjustified. Revoke at least 8-10 accounts with no documented need. Keep documentation of removal
2. Week 1-2: For remaining 14-16 accounts: Get retroactive business owner approval or plan revocation
3. Week 2: Update access request workflow: REQUIRE business owner sign-off + documented business justification (free-text reason)
4. Week 2-3: Implement technical control: Access system blocks approval until business owner field is filled
5. Week 3: Quarterly access review process: Every 90 days, all admins reviewed with managers + business owners. Unused access removed
6. Week 4: Train all requesters + approvers on new SOX requirements. Document in policy manual

Owner & Timeline: Chief Security Officer (Decision) + Identity Management Team (Executor). Critical remediation due by Feb 15 for SOX audit. Quarterly reviews must start by March 31.

What This Means: 312 of 1,115 tickets (28%) were closed without proper documentation. Specifically: 189 missing resolution notes, 156 missing root cause analysis, 98 missing workaround details. These gaps break the incident management audit trail and prevent knowledge reuse (causing repeated incidents). Violates ITIL INC.01 control requirements.

Business Impact:

• 🔄 Repeated incidents: Without documented root causes, same issues happen repeatedly (AUD-002 - Yardi auth - is partly due to this)
• ⏱️ Inefficiency: New team members can't reference past solutions. Resolve time is longer, costing ~$80K/year in extra labor
• ⚖️ Audit trail broken: Cannot trace what happened, when, why, or who did it. Fails audit requirement for incident management proof
• 💰 Knowledge loss: When staff leaves, their incident knowledge leaves with them. Zero organizational memory
• 📊 Business intelligence: Cannot analyze trends (which systems fail most, which teams are slowest, etc.) - decisions are guessed

Root Cause: Closing tickets is rush process - staff wants to mark "done" and move to next ticket. Incident management tool doesn't require resolution notes (fields are optional). Managers don't enforce documentation. No audit of documentation completeness before ticket closure.

How To Fix (30-day action plan):

1. Week 1: Immediate: Make "Resolution Notes", "Root Cause", "Workaround" REQUIRED fields in incident management tool. Cannot save/close ticket without them filled
2. Week 1-2: Retroactive action: Go back 30 days (318 recent tickets). Contact resolving engineer for missing documentation. Get it entered or reopen ticket
3. Week 2: Create documentation standards: Examples of good "Root Cause" (technical analysis, not just "fixed it"). Templates for common issue types
4. Week 2-3: Manager oversight: Every Friday, L1/L2 manager reviews closed tickets from their team. Checks for complete documentation. Sends back incomplete ones for rework
5. Week 3-4: Training: 1-hour workshop for all support staff. How to write good root cause analysis. Show examples of good/bad documentation
6. Week 4: Monitor: Weekly report of documentation completeness % by team. Target: 100% of new tickets. Publicize results

Owner & Timeline: Incident Manager (Decision maker) + IT Support Manager (Executor) + System Admin (technical changes). Documentation requirement must go live by Jan 20 (15 days). Retroactive work by Jan 27. Ongoing monitoring starts Feb 1.

What This Means: 89 tickets that required urgent escalation to management were delayed by an average of 18 hours from when the escalation request was made. Root cause: The escalation procedure is not documented clearly for night shift (6PM-8AM). L1 support team doesn't know who to call when manager is offline. Violates ITIL INC.05 escalation requirements.

Business Impact:

• ⏰ Extended downtime: 18-hour delay on critical tickets = problems stay broken longer. Average cost: $4,200 per 18-hour delay
• 💰 Financial impact: 89 tickets × $4,200 = ~$374K in cost from extended downtime
• 😤 Customer frustration: Residents can't reach help when problem occurs (evening/night). Feel abandoned. Complaint letters received from 3 building residents
• 👥 Staff stress: Night shift staff unsure what to do, so problems languish. Creates burnout and high turnover (2 resignations in last quarter)
• ⚖️ Compliance: ITIL INC.05 requires escalation path within 2 hours for critical issues. Current 18-hour delay is massive violation

Root Cause: Escalation process not documented for off-hours. Only day shift manager knows procedure. Night shift staff have no escalation runbook. On-call rotation exists but nobody knows how to trigger it. No automated escalation email/SMS sent when escalation is requested.

How To Fix (20-day action plan):

1. Day 1-3: Create escalation runbook: Who to call for what issue type, at what hour. Include home phone numbers for on-call rotation (encrypted). Distribute to all L1 staff
2. Day 1-3: Set up automated escalation: When L1 marks "Escalation Required" checkbox, automatically SMS + email on-call manager. Include ticket details
3. Day 3-5: Train night shift (6PM-8AM staff): 30-minute training on escalation process. Walk through 3 example scenarios
4. Day 5: Create quick-reference card: Print card with escalation contacts and procedures. Post in IT ops area + send to everyone
5. Day 5-10: Implement escalation SLA: Manager must acknowledge escalation within 15 minutes. Track and report weekly
6. Day 10-20: Monitor: Check first 10 escalations. Verify 15-min response time. If missed, immediate retraining

Owner & Timeline: IT Operations Manager (Escalation procedure owner) + System Admin (automation setup). Escalation runbook due by Jan 18. Automated SMS/email by Jan 22. Training done by Jan 25. Monitoring ongoing weekly.